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Abstract
The fuzzy modality probably is interpreted over
probabilistic type spaces by taking expected truth
values. The arising probabilistic fuzzy descrip-
tion logic is invariant under probabilistic bisimi-
larity; more informatively, it is non-expansive wrt.
a suitable notion of behavioural distance. In the
present paper, we provide a characterization of the
expressive power of this logic based on this obser-
vation: We prove a probabilistic analogue of the
classical van Benthem theorem, which states that
modal logic is precisely the bisimulation-invariant
fragment of first-order logic. Specifically, we show
that every formula in probabilistic fuzzy first-order
logic that is non-expansive wrt. behavioural dis-
tance can be approximated by concepts of bounded
rank in probabilistic fuzzy description logic.
For a modal logic perspective on the same result,
see [Wild et al., 2018b].
1 Introduction
In the representation of uncertain knowledge, one will often
wish to avoid mention of exact numerical probabilities, e.g.
when these are not precisely known or not relevant to the
representation task at hand – as a typical example, a medical
practitioner will rarely name a numerical threshold for the
likelihood of a diagnosis, and instead qualify the diagnosis as,
say, ‘suspected’ or ‘probable’. This has led to efforts aimed at
formalizing a modality probably, used alternatively to modal-
ities ‘with probability at least p’ [Larsen and Skou, 1991;
Heifetz and Mongin, 2001; Lutz and Schro¨der, 2010]. Such
a formalization may be approached in a two-valued setting
via qualitative axiomatizations of likelihood [Burgess, 1969;
Halpern and Rabin, 1987] or via threshold probabili-
ties [Hamblin, 1959; Herzig, 2003]. In a fuzzy setting,
‘probably’ leads a natural life as a fuzzy modality P,
whose truth value just increases as its argument be-
comes more probable (this modality thus connects the
otherwise well-distinguished worlds of fuzziness and
probability [Lukasiewicz and Straccia, 2008]). The se-
mantics of this operator, first defined by Zadeh [1968],
interprets Pφ as the expected truth value of φ. It
appears in various fuzzy propositional [Ha´jek, 2007;
Flaminio and Godo, 2007], modal [Desharnais et al., 1999;
van Breugel and Worrell, 2005], fixpoint [Kozen, 1985;
Huth and Kwiatkowska, 1997], and description log-
ics [Schro¨der and Pattinson, 2011].
In the present paper, we pin down the exact expressive-
ness of the basic description logic of probably, which we
briefly refer to as probabilistic fuzzy ALC or ALC(P),
within a natural ambient probabilistic fuzzy first-order logic
FO(P), by providing a modal characterization theorem.
The prototype of such characterization theorems is van
Benthem’s theorem [1976], which states that (classical)
modal logic is precisely the bisimulation-invariant fragment
of first-order logic. It has been noted that in systems
with numerical values, behavioural pseudometrics offer a
more fine-grained measure of equivalence than two-valued
bisimilarity [Giacalone et al., 1990; Desharnais et al., 1999;
van Breugel and Worrell, 2005; Desharnais et al., 2008;
Baldan et al., 2014]. When propositional connectives
are equipped with Zadeh semantics, ALC(P) is non-
expansive wrt. behavioural distance; we continue to refer
to this property as bisimulation invariance. In previous
work [Wild et al., 2018a] we have shown that relational
fuzzy modal logic is the bisimulation-invariant fragment
of fuzzy FOL, more precisely that every bisimulation-
invariant fuzzy FO formula can be approximated by
fuzzy modal formulae of bounded rank. The bound
on the rank is key; without it, the statement turns into
a form of the (much simpler) Hennessy-Milner theo-
rem [Hennessy and Milner, 1985] (which classically states
that non-bisimilar states in finitely branching systems can be
distinguished by modal formulae), and indeed does not need
to assume FO definability of the given bisimulation-invariant
property [van Breugel and Worrell, 2005]. Here, we establish
a corresponding result for the rather more involved proba-
bilistic setting: We show that every bisimulation-invariant
formula in probabilistic fuzzy FOL can be approximated in
bounded rank in probabilistic fuzzy ALC . This means not
only that, up to approximation, ALC(P) is as powerful as
FO(P) on bisimulation-invariant properties, but also that
ALC(P) provides effective syntax for bisimulation-invariant
FO(P), which FO(P) itself does not [Otto, 2006].
Proofs are mostly omitted or only sketched; full proofs are
in the appendix.
Related Work There is widespread interest in modal char-
acterization theorems in modal logic [Dawar and Otto, 2005],
database theory [Figueira et al., 2015], concur-
rency [Janin and Walukiewicz, 1995; Carreiro, 2015],
and AI [Sturm and Wolter, 2001; Wild and Schro¨der, 2017;
Wild et al., 2018a]. The overall structure of our proof builds
partly on that of our modal characterization theorem for
relational fuzzy modal logic [Wild et al., 2018a] (in turn
based ultimately on a strategy due to Otto [2004]) but deals
with a much more involved logic, which instead of just
the lattice structure of the unit interval involves its full
arithmetic structure, via the use of probabilities and expected
values, necessitating, e.g., the use of Kantorovich-Rubinstein
duality. Notable contributions of our proof include new
forms of probabilistic bisimulation games up-to-ǫ (different
from games introduced by Desharnais et al. [2008], which
characterize a different metric) and Ehrenfeucht-Fraı¨sse´
games, related to two-valued games considered in the context
of topological FOL [Makowsky and Ziegler, 1980]. (For lack
of space, we omit discussion of quantitative Hennessy-Milner
type results beyond the mentioned result by van Breugel and
Worrell [2005].)
FO(P) may be seen as a fuzzy variant of Halpern’s [1990]
type-1 (i.e. statistical) two-valued probabilistic FOL,
and uses a syntax related to coalgebraic predicate
logic [Litak et al., 2018] and, ultimately, Chang’s
modal predicate logic [Chang, 1973]. Van-Benthem
style theorems for two-valued coalgebraic modal
logic [Schro¨der et al., 2017] instantiate to two-valued
probabilistic modal logic, then establishing expressibility
of bisimulation-invariant probabilistic FO formulae by
probabilistic modal formulae with infinite conjunction but
of bounded rank, in an apparent analogy to bounded-rank
approximation in the fuzzy setting.
2 Fuzzy Probabilistic Logics
We proceed to introduce the logics featuring in our main
result. We fix (w.l.o.g., finite) sets NC of atomic concepts
and NR of roles; concepts C,D of quantitative probabilistic
ALC (ALC(P)) are defined by the grammar
C,D ::= q | A | C ⊖ q | ¬C | C ⊓D | P r. C
where q ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1], A ∈ NC and r ∈ NR. The intended
reading of P is ‘probably’; we give examples below. Slightly
deviating from standard practice, we define the rank rk(C) of
a conceptC as the maximal nesting depth of the P and atomic
concepts in C; e.g. rk((P r.P s. A)⊓(P r. B)) = 3. We de-
note the set of all concepts of rank at most n byALC(P)n.
Concepts are interpreted over probabilistic structures to
which we neutrally refer as interpretations or, briefly, mod-
els. We allow infinite models but restrict to discrete probabil-
ity distributions over successors at each state. A model
I = (∆I , (AI)A∈NC , (r
I)r∈NR)
consists of a domain∆I of states or individuals, and interpre-
tations AI : ∆I → [0, 1], rI : ∆I × ∆I → [0, 1] of atomic
concepts A and roles r such that for each a ∈ ∆I , the map
ra : ∆
I → [0, 1], ra(a
′) = rI(a, a′)
is either zero or a probability mass function on∆I , i.e.∑
a′∈∆I ra(a
′) ∈ {0, 1}
(implying that the support {a′ ∈ ∆I | ra(a
′) > 0}
of ra is at most countable). We call a state a r-blocking if∑
a′∈∆I ra(a
′) = 0. At non-blocking states a, ra thus acts
as a probabilistic accessibility relation; we abuse ra to denote
also the probability measure defined by ra.
The interpretation CI : ∆I → [0, 1] of concepts is defined
recursively, extending that of atomic concepts, by
qI(a) = q
(C ⊖ q)I(a) = max(CI(a)− q, 0)
(¬C)I(a) = 1− CI(a)
(C ⊓D)I(a) = min(CI(a), DI(a))
(P r. C)I(a) = Era(C
I) =
∑
a′∈∆I ra(a
′) · CI(a′)
At non-blocking a, (P r. C)I(a) is thus the expected truth
value of C for a random r-successor of a. We define disjunc-
tion ⊔ as the dual of ⊓ as usual, so ⊔ takes maxima. We use
Zadeh semantics for the propositional operators, which will
later ensure non-expansiveness wrt. behavioural distance; see
additional comments in Section 7.
Up to minor variations, our models correspond to
Markov chains or, in an epistemic reading, type spaces
(e.g. [Heifetz and Mongin, 2001]). The logic ALC(P) was
considered (with Łukasiewicz semantics) by Schro¨der and
Pattinson [2011], and resembles van Breugel and Worrell’s
quantitative probabilistic modal logic [2005]. E.g., in a read-
ing of∆I as consisting of real-world individuals, the concept
Loud⊓P hasSource. (Large⊓P hasMood.Angry)
describes noises you hear in your tent at night as being loud
and probably coming from the large and probably angry ani-
mal whose shadow just crossed the tent roof. (In this view, P
can be usefully combined with crisp or fuzzy relational
modalities, using off-the-shelf compositionality mechanisms
[Schro¨der and Pattinson, 2011].) In an epistemic reading
where the elements of ∆I are possible worlds, and the roles
are understood as epistemic agents, the concept
¬GoodHand⊓ P player.P opponent.GoodHand
denotes the degree to which player believes she is success-
fully bluffing by letting opponent overestimate player’s hand.
For readability, we will restrict the technical treatment to
a single role r, omitted in the syntax, from now on, not-
ing that covering multiple roles amounts to no more than
additional indexing. As the first-order correspondence lan-
guage of quantitative probabilistic ALC we introduce quan-
titative probabilistic first-order logic (FO(P)), with formulae
φ, ψ, . . . defined by the grammar
φ, ψ ::= q | A(x) | x = y | φ⊖ q | ¬φ | φ⊓ψ | ∃x. φ
| xP⌈y : φ⌉ (q ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1], A ∈ NC)
where x and y range over a fixed countably infinite reser-
voir of variables. The reading of xP⌈y : φ⌉ is the expected
truth value of φ at a random successor y of x. (In particu-
lar, when φ is crisp, then xP⌈y : φ⌉ is just the probability
of y satisfying φ, similar to the weights wy(φ) in Halpern’s
type-1 probabilistic FOL [1990].) We have the expected no-
tions of free and bound variables, under the additional proviso
that y (but not x!) is bound in xP⌈y : φ⌉. The (quantifier)
rank qr(φ) of a formula φ is the maximal nesting depth of the
variable-binding operators∃ andP and propositional atomsA
in φ; e.g. ∃x. xP⌈y : A(y)⌉ has rank 3.
Given a model I = (∆I , (AI)A∈NC , r
I) and a vector
a¯ = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ (∆
I)n of values, the semantics of
the logic assigns a truth value φ(a¯) ∈ [0, 1] to a formula
φ(x1, . . . , xn) with free variables at most x1, . . . , xn. We
define φ(a¯) recursively by essentially the same clauses as in
ALC(P) for the propositional constructs, and
A(xi)(a¯) = A
I(ai)
(∃x0. φ(x0, x1, . . . , xn))(a¯) =
∨
a0∈∆I
φ(a0, a1, . . . , an)
(xiP⌈y : φ(y, x1, . . . , xn)⌉)(a¯) = Erai (φ( · , a1, . . . , an))
where
∨
takes suprema. Moreover, equality is two-valued,
i.e. (xi = xj)(a¯) is 1 if ai = aj , and 0 otherwise.
E.g. the formula xP⌈z : z = y⌉ (‘the successor of x
is probably y’) denotes the access probability from x to y,
xP⌈z : zP⌈w : w = y⌉⌉ the probability of reaching y from x
in two independently distributed steps, and ∃y. xP⌈z : z =
y⌉ the probability of the most probable successor of x.
We have a standard translation STx from ALC(P) into
FO(P), indexed over a variable x naming the current state.
Following Litak et al. [2018], we define STx recursively by
STx(A) = A(x)
STx(PC) = xP⌈y : STy(C)⌉,
and by commutation with all other constructs.
Lemma 2.1. For every ALC(P)-concept C and state a,
C(a) = STx(C)(a).
ST thus identifiesALC(P) as a fragment of FO(P).
3 Behavioural Distances and Games
We next discuss several notions of behavioural distance
between states: via fixed point iteration a` la Wasser-
stein/Kantorovich, via games and via the logic. We fo-
cus mostly on depth-n distances. Only for one version,
we define also the unbounded distance, which will fea-
ture in the modal characterization result. We show in Sec-
tion 4 that at finite depth, all these distances coincide. It
has been shown in previous work [Desharnais et al., 2004;
van Breugel and Worrell, 2005] that the unbounded-depth
distances defined via Kantorovich fixed point iteration and via
the logic, respectively, coincide in very similar settings; such
results can be seen as probabilistic variants of the Hennessy-
Milner theorem.
We recall standard notions on pseudometric spaces:
Definition 3.1 (Pseudometric spaces, non-expansive maps).
A (bounded) pseudometric on a set X is a function d : X ×
X → [0, 1] such that for x, y, z ∈ X , the following axioms
hold: d(x, x) = 0 (reflexivity), d(x, y) = d(y, x) (symme-
try), d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y) + d(y, z) (triangle inequality). If
additionally d(x, y) = 0 implies x = y, then d is a met-
ric. A (pseudo)metric space (X, d) consists of a set X and a
(pseudo)metric d onX .
A map f : X → [0, 1] is non-expansive wrt. a pseudo-
metric d if |f(x) − f(y)| ≤ d(x, y) for all x, y ∈ X . The
space of these non-expansive functions, denoted Pred(X, d),
is equipped with the supremum (pseudo)metric d∞,
d∞(f, g) = ‖f − g‖∞ =
∨
x∈X |f(x)− g(x)|.
We denote by Bǫ(x) = {y ∈ X | d(x, y) ≤ ǫ} the ball of ra-
dius ǫ around x in (X, d). The space (X, d) is totally bounded
if for every ǫ > 0 there exists a finite ǫ-cover, i.e. finitely
many elements x1, . . . , xn ∈ X such thatX =
⋃n
i=1 Bǫ(xi).
Recall that a metric space is compact iff it is complete and
totally bounded.
We next introduce the Wasserstein and Kantorovich dis-
tances, which coincide according to Kantorovich-Rubinstein
duality. To this end, we first need the notion of a coupling of
two probability distributions, from which the original distri-
butions are factored out as marginals.
Definition 3.2. Let π1 and π2 be discrete probability mea-
sures on A and B, respectively. We denote by Cpl(π1, π2)
the set of couplings of π1 and π2, i.e. probability measures µ
on A× B such that π1 and π2 are marginals of µ:
• for all a ∈ A,
∑
b∈B µ(a, b) = π1(a);
• for all b ∈ B,
∑
a∈A µ(a, b) = π2(b).
Definition 3.3 (Wasserstein and Kantorovich distances). Let
(X, d) be a pseudometric space. We generally write
DX
for the set of discrete probability distributions on X . We de-
fine two pseudometrics on DX , the Kantorovich distance d↑
and theWasserstein distance d↓:
d↑(π1, π2) =
∨
{|Eπ1(f)− Eπ2(f)| | f ∈ Pred(X, d)}
d↓(π1, π2) =
∧
{Eµ(d) | µ ∈ Cpl(π1, π2)}
where
∧
takes meets (and
∨
suprema). We extend these
distances without further mention to zero functions (like the
functions ra at blocking states a) by decreeing that the zero
function has distance 1 from all probability distributions.
The notation d↑, d↓ is meant as a mnemonic for the fact
that these distances are obtained via suprema respectively via
infima. If (X, d) is separable (contains a countable dense
subset), these pseudometrics coincide, a fact known as the
Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality (e.g. [Dudley, 2002]):
Lemma 3.4 (Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality). Let (X, d) be
a separable pseudometric space. Then for all π1, π2 ∈ DX ,
d↑(π1, π2) = d
↓(π1, π2).
The above notions of lifting a distance on X to a distance on
distributions overX can be used to give fixed point equations
for behavioural distances on models.
Definition 3.5 (Fixed point iteration a` la Wasser-
stein/Kantorovich). Given a model I, we define the
chains (dKn ), (d
W
n ) of depth-n Kantorovich and Wasserstein
distances, respectively, via fixed point iteration:
dW0 (a, b) = d
K
0 (a, b) = 0
dWn+1(a, b) =
∨
A∈NC
|AI(a)−AI(b)| ∨ (dWn )
↓(πa, πb)
dKn+1(a, b) =
∨
A∈NC
|AI(a)−AI(b)| ∨ (dKn )
↑(πa, πb)
where ∨ is binary join. We extend this to states a, b in differ-
ent models I, J by taking the disjoint union of I, J .
In both cases, we start with the zero pseudometric, and in
the next iteration lift the pseudometric dn from the previous
step via Wasserstein/Kantorovich. This lifted metric is then
applied to the probability distributions πa, πb associated with
a, b. In addition we take the maximum with the supremum
over the distances for all atomic A ∈ NC.
We now introduce a key tool for our technical develop-
ment, a new up-to-ǫ bisimulation game inspired by the def-
inition of the Wasserstein distance.
Definition 3.6 (Bisimulation game). Given models I,J ,
a0 ∈ ∆
I , b0 ∈ ∆
J , and ǫ0 ∈ [0, 1], the ǫ0-bisimulation
game for a0 and b0 is played by Spoiler (S) and Duplicator
(D), with rules as follows:
• Configurations: triples (a, b, ǫ), with states a ∈ ∆I ,
b ∈ ∆J and maximal allowed deviation ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. The
initial configuration is (a0, b0, ǫ0).
• Moves: In each round, D first picks a probability mea-
sure µ ∈ Cpl(πa, πb). Then, D distributes the devia-
tion ǫ over all pairs (a′, b′) of successors, i.e. picks a
function ǫ′ : ∆I × ∆J → [0, 1] such that Eµ(ǫ
′) ≤ ǫ.
Finally, S picks a pair (a′, b′) with µ(a′, b′) > 0; the
new configuration is then (a′, b′, ǫ′(a′, b′)).
• D wins if both states are blocking or ǫ = 1.
• S wins if exactly one state is blocking and ǫ < 1.
• Winning condition: |AI(a)−AJ (b)| ≤ ǫ for allA ∈ NC.
The game comes in two variants, the (unbounded) bisimula-
tion game and the n-round bisimulation game, where n ≥ 0.
Player D wins if the winning condition holds before every
round, otherwise S wins. More precisely, D wins the un-
bounded game if she can force an infinite play and the n-
round game once n rounds have been played (the winning
condition is not checked after the last round, so in particular,
any 0-round game is an immediate win forD).
Remark 3.7. The above bisimulation game dif-
fers from bisimulation games in the literature
(e.g. [Desharnais et al., 2008]) in a number of salient
features. A particularly striking aspect is that D’s moves
are not similar to those of S, and moreover D in fact moves
before S. Intuitively,D is required to commit beforehand to
a strategy that she will use to respond to S’s next move. Note
also that the precision ǫ changes as the game is being played,
a complication forced by the arithmetic nature of models.
This leads to notions of game distance:
Definition 3.8. depth-n game distance dGn and (unbounded-
depth) game distance dG are defined as
dGn (a, b) =
∧
{ǫ | D wins Gn(a, b, ǫ)}
dG(a, b) =
∧
{ǫ | D wins G(a, b, ǫ)}.
where G(a, b, ǫ) and Gn(a, b, ǫ) denote the the bisimulation
game and the n-round bisimulation game on (a, b, ǫ), respec-
tively.
Finally we define the depth-n logical distance via ALC(P),
restricting to concepts of rank at most n:
Definition 3.9. The depth-n logical distance dLn(a, b) of
states a, b in models I, J is defined as
dLn(a, b) =
∨
{|CI(a)− CJ (b)| | rk(C) ≤ n}.
The equivalence of the four bounded-depth behavioural dis-
tances introduced above will be shown in Theorem 4.3.
Behavioural distance forms the yardstick for our notion of
bisimulation invariance; for definiteness:
Definition 3.10. A quantitative, i.e. [0, 1]-valued, propertyQ
of states, or a formula or concept defining such a property, is
bisimulation-invariant if Q is non-expansive wrt. game dis-
tance, i.e. for states a, b in models I,J , respectively,
|Q(a)−Q(b)| ≤ dG(a, b).
Similarly,Q is depth-n bisimulation invariant, or finite-depth
bisimulation invariant if mention of n is omitted, ifQ is non-
expansive wrt. dGn in the same sense.
It is easy to see that ALC(P)-concepts are bisimulation-
invariant. More precisely, ALC(P)-concepts of rank at
most n are depth-n bisimulation invariant (a stronger invari-
ance since clearly dGn ≤ d
G), as shown by routine induction.
In contrast, many other properties of states are expressible in
FO(P) but not in ALC(P), as they fail to be bisimulation-
invariant. Examples include xP⌈y : x = y⌉ (probability of
a self-transition) and ∃z. xP⌈y : y = z⌉ (highest transition
probability to a successor).
We are now ready to formally state our main theorem (a
proof will be given in Section 6):
Theorem 3.11 (Modal characterization). Every bisimulation-
invariant FO(P)-formula of rank at most n can be approxi-
mated (uniformly across all models) by ALC(P)-concepts of
rank at most 3n.
(The exponential bound on the rank features also in the full
statement of van Benthem’s theorem.)
4 Modal Approximation at Finite Depth
We now establish the most important stepping stone on the
way to the eventual proof of the modal characterization the-
orem: We show that every depth-n bisimulation-invariant
property of states can be approximated by ALC(P)-concepts
of rank at most n. We prove this simultaneously with coinci-
dence of the various finite-depth behavioural pseudometrics
defined in the previous section. To begin,
Lemma 4.1. The game-based pseudometric dGn coincides
with the Wasserstein pseudometric dWn ,
We note next that the modality P is non-expansive: We ex-
tend P to act on [0, 1]-valued functions f : ∆I → [0, 1] by
(Pf)(a) = Era(f).
Lemma 4.2. The map f 7→ Pf is non-expansive wrt. the
supremum metric, that is ‖Pf − Pg‖∞ ≤ ‖f − g‖∞ for all
f, g : ∆I → [0, 1].
Following our previous work [Wild et al., 2018a], we prove
coincidence of the remaining pseudometrics in one big in-
duction, along with total boundedness (needed later to apply
a variant of the Arzela`-Ascoli theorem and the Kantorovich-
Rubinstein duality) and modal approximability of depth-n
bisimulation-invariant properties. We phrase the latter as den-
sity of the (semantics of)ALC(P)-concepts of rank at most n
in the non-expansive function space (Definition 3.1):
Theorem 4.3. Let I be a model. Then for all n ≥ 0,
1. we have dGn = d
W
n = d
K
n = d
L
n =: dn on I;
2. the pseudometric space (∆I , dn) is totally bounded;
3. ALC(P)n is a dense subset of Pred(∆
I , dn).
Proof sketch. By simultaneous induction on n.
In the base case n = 0, all the behavioural distances are the
zero pseudometric, so that total boundedness follows trivially
and the density claim follows because non-expansive maps
are just constants in [0, 1] and the syntax ofALC(P) includes
truth constants q ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1].
For the inductive step, let I be a model and n > 0, and
assume as the inductive hypothesis that all claims in Theo-
rem 4.3 hold for all n′ < n. We begin with Item 1; dGn = d
W
n
is already proved (Lemma 4.1).
• dWn = d
K
n follows by Kantorovich-Rubinstein dual-
ity (Lemma 3.4), since every totally bounded pseudometric
space is separable.
• dKn = d
L
n : By Lemma 4.2 and the inductive hypothesis,
P[ALC(P)n−1] is dense in P[Pred(∆
I , dn−1)]. Thus, the
supremum in the definition of dKn does not change when it
is taken only over the concepts in ALC(P)n−1 instead of all
nonexpansive properties. The proof is finished by a simple
induction over propositional combinations of concepts.
Item 2: By the inductive hypothesis, the space (∆I , dn−1)
is totally bounded. By the Arzela`-Ascoli theorem (in a ver-
sion for totally bounded spaces and non-expansive maps,
cf. [Wild et al., 2018a]), it follows that Pred(∆I , dn−1) is
totally bounded wrt. the supremum pseudometric. This im-
plies that depth-n distances can be approximated up to ǫ by
examining differences at only finitely many, saym, concepts.
As ([0, 1]m, d∞) is totally bounded, (∆
I , dn) is, too.
Item 3: By the Stone-Weierstraß theorem (again in
a version for totally bounded spaces and non-expansive
maps [Wild et al., 2018a]) it suffices to give, for each ǫ > 0,
each non-expansivemap f ∈ Pred(∆I , dn), and each pair of
states a, b ∈ ∆I a concept C ∈ ALC(P)n such that
max(|f(a)− CI(a)|, |f(b)− CI(b)|) ≤ ǫ.
To construct such a C, we note that |f(a)− f(b)| ≤ dLn(a, b)
(by non-expansiveness), so there exists some D ∈ ALC(P)n
such that |DI(a)−DI(b)| ≥ |f(a)− f(b)|− ǫ. FromD, we
can construct C using truncated subtraction ⊖.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.3. Now that we
can approximate depth-k bisimulation-invariant properties by
ALC(P)-concepts of rank k on any fixed model, we need
to make the approximation uniform across all models. We
achieve this by means of a final model, i.e. one that realizes
all behaviours. Formally:
Definition 4.4. A (probabilistic) boundedmorphism between
models I, J is a map f : ∆I → ∆J such that AI =
f−1[AJ ] for each A ∈ NC and rf(a)(B) = ra(f
−1[B]) for
all B ⊆ ∆J , a ∈ ∆I (implying that a is blocking iff f(a)
is blocking). A model F is final if for every model I, there
exists a unique bounded morphism I → F .
It follows from standard results in coalgebra [Barr, 1993] that
a final model exists. Bounded morphisms preserve behaviour
on-the-nose, that is:
Lemma 4.5. Let f : I → J be a bounded morphism. Then,
for any a ∈ ∆I , dG(a, f(a)) = 0.
This entails the following lemma, which will enable us to
use approximants on the final model as uniform approximants
across all models:
Lemma 4.6. Let F be a final model, and let φ and ψ be
bisimulation-invariant first-order properties. Then, for any
model I, ‖φ− ψ‖I∞ ≤ ‖φ− ψ‖
F
∞.
5 Locality
The proof of the modal characterization theorem now fur-
ther proceeds by first establishing that every bisimulation-
invariant first-order formula φ is local in a sense to be made
precise shortly, and subsequently that φ is in fact even finite-
depth bisimulation invariant, for a depth that is exponential
in the rank of φ. Locality refers to a probabilistic variant of
Gaifman graphs [Gaifman, 1982]:
Definition 5.1. Let I be a model.
• The Gaifman graph of I is the undirected graph on the
set ∆I of vertices that has an edge for every pair (a, b) with
rI(a, b) > 0 or rI(b, a) > 0.
• The Gaifman distance D : ∆I × ∆I → N ∪ {∞} is
graph distance in the Gaifman graph: For every a, b ∈ ∆I ,
the distanceD(a, b) is the least number of edges on any path
from a to b, if such a path exists, and∞ otherwise.
• For a ∈ ∆I and k ≥ 0, the radius k neighbourhood
Uk(a) = {b ∈ ∆I | D(a, b) ≤ k} of a consists of the states
reachable from a in at most k steps.
• The restriction of I to Uk(a) is the model Ika with set
Uk(a) of states, and
AI
k
a (b) = AI(b) rI
k
a (b, c) =
{
rI(b, c) ifD(a, b) < k
0 ifD(a, b) = k
for A ∈ NC and b, c ∈ U
k(a).
The restriction to Uk(a) thus makes all states at distance k
blocking. Restricted models have the expected relationship
with games of bounded depth:
Lemma 5.2. Let a be a state in a model I. Then D wins the
k-round 0-bisimulation game for I, a and Ika , a.
Locality of a formula now means that its truth values only
depend on the neighbourhood of the state in question:
Definition 5.3. A formula φ(x) is k-local for a radius k if for
every model I and every a ∈ ∆I , φI(a) = φI
k
a (a).
As ALC(P)-concepts are bisimulation-invariant, Lemma 5.2
implies
Lemma 5.4. Every ALC(P)-concept of rank at most k is k-
local.
To prove locality of bisimulation-invariant FO(P)-formulae,
we require a model-theoretic tool, an adaptation of Ehren-
feucht-Fraı¨sse´ equivalence to the probabilistic setting:
Definition 5.5. Let I,J be models, and let a¯0 and b¯0 be
vectors of equal length over ∆I and ∆J , respectively. The
Ehrenfeucht-Fraı¨sse´ game for I, a¯0 and J , b¯0, played by
Spoiler (S) and Duplicator (D), is given as follows.
• Configurations: pairs (a¯, b¯) of vectors a¯ over ∆I and b¯
over∆J ; the initial configuration is (a¯0, b¯0).
• Moves: Each round can be played in one of two ways,
chosen by S:
– Standard round: S selects a state in one model, say
a ∈ ∆I , and D then has to select a state in the other
model, say b ∈ ∆J , reaching the configuration (a¯a, b¯b).
– Probabilistic round: S selects an index i and a
fuzzy subset in one model, say φA : ∆
I → [0, 1]. D
then has to select a fuzzy subset in the other model, say
φB : ∆
J → [0, 1], such that Erai (φA) = Erbi (φB).
Then, S selects an element on one side, say a ∈ ∆I ,
such that rai(a) > 0, and D subsequently selects an
element on the other side, say b ∈ ∆J , such that
φA(a) = φB(b) and rbi(b) > 0, reaching the config-
uration (a¯a, b¯b).
• Winning conditions: Any player who cannot move loses.
S wins if a configuration is reached (including the ini-
tial configuration) that fails to be a partial isomorphism.
Here, a configuration (a¯, b¯) is a partial isomorphism if
– ai = aj ⇐⇒ bi = bj
– AI(ai) = A
J (bi) for all i and all A ∈ NC
– rI(ai, aj) = r
J (bi, bj) for all i, j.
PlayerD wins if she reaches the n-th round (maintaining
configurations that are not winning for S).
For our purposes, we need only soundness of Ehrenfeucht-
Fraı¨sse´ equivalence:
Lemma 5.6 (Ehrenfeucht-Fraı¨sse´ invariance). Let I,J be
models, and let a¯0, b¯0 be vectors of length m over ∆
I and
∆J , respectively, such thatD wins the n-round Ehrenfeucht-
Fraı¨sse´ game on a¯0, b¯0. Then for every FO(P)-formula φwith
qr(φ) ≤ n and free variables at most x1, . . . , xm,
φ(a¯0) = φ(b¯0).
Since embeddings into disjoint unions of models are bounded
morphisms, the following is immediate from Lemma 4.5:
Lemma 5.7. Every bisimulation-invariant formula is also in-
variant under disjoint union.
We are now in a position to prove our desired locality result:
Lemma 5.8 (Locality). Let φ(x) be a bisimulation-invariant
FO(P)-formula of rank n with one free variable x. Then φ is
k-local for k = 3n.
Proof sketch. Let a be a state in a model I. We need to show
φI(a) = φI
k
a (a). Construct models J ,K that extend I
and Ika , respectively, by adding n disjoint copies of both I
and Ika . We finish the proof by showing that
φI(a) = φJ (a) = φK(a) = φI
k
a (a).
The first and third equality follow by bisimulation invariance
of φ (Lemma 5.7), and the second using Lemma 5.6, by giv-
ing a winning invariant for D in the n-round Ehrenfeucht-
Fraı¨sse´ game for J , a and K, a.
6 Proof of the Main Result
Having established locality of bisimulation-invariant first-
order formulae and modal approximability of finite-depth
bisimulation-invariant properties, we now discharge the last
remaining steps in our programme: We show by means
of an unravelling construction that bisimulation-invariant
first-order formulae are already finite-depth bisimulation-
invariant, and then conclude the proof of our main result, the
modal characterization theorem.
Definition 6.1. Let I be a model. The unravelling I∗ of I
is a model with non-empty finite sequences a¯ ∈ (∆I)+ as
states, where atomic concepts and roles are interpreted by
AI
∗
(a¯) = AI(last(a¯)) rI
∗
(a¯, a¯a) = rI(last(a¯), a),
for a¯ ∈ (∆I)+ and a ∈ ∆I , where last takes last elements.
As usual, models are bisimilar to their unravellings:
Lemma 6.2. For any model I and a ∈ ∆I ,D has a winning
strategy in the 0-bisimulation game for I, a and I∗, a.
We next show that locality and bisimulation invariance imply
finite-depth bisimulation invariance:
Lemma 6.3. Let φ be bisimulation invariant and k-local.
Then φ is depth-k bisimulation invariant.
Proof sketch. By unravelling (Lemma 6.2) and locality
(Lemma 5.2), we need only consider depth-k tree models.
On such models, winning strategies in k-round bisimulation
games automatically win also the unrestricted game.
This allows us to wrap up the proof of our main result:
Proof of Theorem 3.11. Let φ be a probabilistic first-order
formula of rank n. By Lemma 5.8 and Lemma 6.3, φ is depth-
k bisimulation-invariant for k = 3n. By Theorem 4.3, for
every ǫ > 0, there exists an ALC(P) concept Cǫ of rank at
most k such that ‖φF −CFǫ ‖∞ ≤ ǫ on the final model F . By
Lemma 4.6, this approximation works over all models.
7 Conclusions
We have established a modal characterization result for a
probabilistic fuzzy DLALC(P), stating that every formula of
quantitative probabilistic FOL that is bisimulation-invariant,
i.e. non-expansive wrt. a natural notion of behavioural dis-
tance, can be approximated byALC(P)-concepts of bounded
modal rank, the bound being exponential in the rank of the
original formula. As discussed in the introduction, the bound
on the modal rank is the crucial feature making this result into
a van-Benthem (rather than Hennessy-Milner) type theorem.
It remains open whether our main result can be
sharpened to make do without approximation. (Simi-
lar open problems persist for the case of fuzzy modal
logic [Wild et al., 2018a] and two-valued probabilistic modal
logic [Schro¨der et al., 2017].) Further directions for future
research include a treatment of Łukasiewicz semantics of
the propositional connectives (for which non-expansiveness
in fact fails). Moreover, the version of our main re-
sult that restricts the semantics to finite models, in anal-
ogy to Rosen’s finite-model version of van Benthem’s the-
orem [Rosen, 1997], remains open.
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A Appendix
A.1 Coalgebraic Modelling
Universal coalgebra [Rutten, 2000] serves as a generic frame-
work for modelling state-based systems, with the system
type encapsulated as a set functor. Although we are only
concerned with a concrete system type in the present pa-
per, we do need coalgebraic methods to some degree. In
particular, the requisite background on behavioural dis-
tances [van Breugel and Worrell, 2005; Baldan et al., 2014]
is largely based on coalgebraic techniques, and moreover we
will need the final coalgebra at one point in the development.
We require only basic definitions, which we recapitulate here
and then instantiate to the case of our notion of model.
Recall first that a set functor F : Set → Set consists
of an assignment of a set FX to every set X and a map
Ff : FX → FY to every map f : X → Y , preserving iden-
tities and composition. The core example of a functor for the
present purposes is the distribution functor D, which assigns
to a setX the set DX of discrete probability measures onX ,
and to a map f : X → Y the mapDf : DX → DY that takes
image measures; explicitly,Df(µ) is the image measure of µ
along f , given by Df(µ)(A) = µ(f−1[A]). Functors can be
combined by taking products and sums: Given set functors
F,G : Set→ Set, the set functorsF ×G,F +G : Set→ Set
are given by (F × G)X = FX × GX and (F + G)X =
FX +GX , respectively, with the evident action on maps in
both cases; here, + denotes disjoint union as usual. Every
set C induces a constant functor, also denoted C and given
byCX = C andCf = idC for every setX and every map f .
Moreover, the identity functor id is given by idX = X and
id f = f for all sets X and all maps f .
An F -coalgebra (A, ξ) for a set functor F consists of a
set X of states and a transition map ξ : A → FA, thought
of as assigning to each state a ∈ A a structured collection
ξ(a) of successors. A D-coalgebra (A, ξ), for instance, is
just a Markov chain: its transition map ξ : A → DA as-
signs to each state a distribution over successor states. Simi-
larly, models in the sense defined above are coalgebras (A, ξ)
for the set functor [0, 1]NC × (D + 1): If ξ(a) = (f, π),
then f : NC → [0, 1] determines the truth values of the
atomic concepts at the state a, and π is either a discrete
probability measure determining the successors of a or a
designated value denoting termination. The probabilistic
transition systems considered by van Breugel and Worrell
[van Breugel and Worrell, 2005], which indexes probabilistic
transition relations over a set Act of actions and moreover
uses unrestricted subdistributions, corresponds to coalgebras
(A, ξ) for the set functorD(id+1)Act – given a state a and an
action c ∈ Act, ξ(a)(c) ∈ D(A+ 1) is a subdistribution over
successor states of a, with the summand 1 serving to absorb
the weight missing to obtain total weight 1.
A morphism f : (A, ξ) → (B, ζ) between F -coalgebras
(A, ξ) and (B, ζ) is a map f : A→ B such that
Ff(ξ(a)) = ζ(f(a))
for all states a ∈ A. Morphisms should be thought of as
behaviour-preserving maps or functional bisimulations. E.g.
f : A → B is a morphism of D-coalgebras (i.e. Markov
chains) (A, ξ) and (B, ζ) if for each set Y ⊆ B and each
state a ∈ A,
ζ(f(a))(Y ) = ξ(a)(f−1[Y ]),
i.e. the probability of reaching Y from f(a) is the same as
that of reaching f−1[Y ] from a. Morphisms of probabilis-
tic transition systems, viewed as coalgebras, satisfy a simi-
lar condition for the successor distributions, and additionally
preserve the truth values of atomic concepts.
An F -coalgebra (Z, ζ) is final if for every F -coalgebra
(A, ξ) there exists exactly one morphism (A, ξ) → (Z, ζ).
Final coalgebras are unique up to isomorphism if they exist,
and should be thought of as having as states all possible be-
haviours of states in F -coalgebras. For our present purposes,
we do not need an explicit description of the final coalgebra;
it suffices to know that since the functor describing proba-
bilistic transition systems is accessible (more precisely ω1-
accessible), a final coalgebra for it, i.e. a final probabilistic
transition system, exists [Barr, 1993].
A.2 Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.4
We make use of the following version of the Kantorovich-
Rubinstein duality [Dudley, 2002, Proposition 11.8.1]:
Lemma A.1 (Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality). Let (X, d) be
a separable metric space, and let P1(X) denote the space
of probability measures µ : B(X) → [0, 1] on the Borel σ-
algebra B(X) such that
∫
d(x, · ) dµ < ∞ for some x ∈ X .
Then for µ1, µ2 ∈ P1(X),
d↑(µ1, µ2) = d
↓(µ1, µ2).
Essentially, we only need to transfer this version of
Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality to the slightly more general
case of pseudometrics.
First, note that the relation x ∼ y : ⇐⇒ d(x, y) = 0 is
an equivalence relation on X . The quotient set Y := X/∼
is made into a metric space (Y, d′), the metric quotient of
(X, d), by taking d′([x], [y]) = d(x, y). Let p : A → B be
the projection map. By construction, p is an isometry. Both
the Kantorovich and the Wasserstein lifting preserve isome-
tries [Baldan et al., 2014], so for all discrete probability mea-
sures µ1, µ2 onX ,
d↑(µ1, µ2) = (d
′)↑((Dp)µ1, (Dp)µ2)
= (d′)↓((Dp)µ1, (Dp)µ2)
= d↓(µ1, µ2).
In the second step we have applied Lemma A.1 to the metric
space (Y, d′), noting that every discrete probability measure
can be defined on the Borel σ-algebra.
Proof of Lemma 4.1.
Induction over n. The base case n = 0 is clear: the 0-round
game is an immediate win for D, so dG0 = d
W
0 = 0. We
proceed with the inductive step from n to n+ 1.
So let a and b be states in a model I. If a and b are both
blocking, then dGn+1(a, b) = d
W
n+1(a, b) = 0. If exactly one
of a, b is blocking, then dGn+1(a, b) = d
W
n+1(a, b) = 1. Now
assume that both a and b are non-blocking.
“≥”: Let dGn+1(a, b) ≤ ǫ, so D wins the (n + 1)-round
bisimulation game on (a, b, ǫ). We show that dWn+1(a, b) ≤ ǫ.
First, for everyA ∈ NC, |A
I(a)−AI(b)| ≤ ǫ by the winning
condition. Second, suppose D chooses µ ∈ Cpl(ra, rb) and
ǫ′ : ∆I × ∆I → [0, 1] in the first turn. By assumption, D
wins the n-round bisimulation game on (a′, b′, ǫ′(a′, b′)) for
every a′, b′ ∈ ∆I , so dWn = d
G
n ≤ ǫ
′ by induction, and thus
Eµ(d
W
n ) ≤ Eµ(ǫ
′) ≤ ǫ.
“≤”: Let dWn+1(a, b) < ǫ. It suffices to give a winning strat-
egy forD in the (n+1)-round bisimulation game on (a, b, ǫ)
(implying dGn+1(a, b) ≤ ǫ). The winning condition in the ini-
tial configuration follows immediately from the assumption.
Also by the assumption, there exists µ ∈ Cpl(ra, rb) such
that Eµ(d
W
n ) < ǫ. As ra and rb are discrete, the set
R := {(a′, b′) | ra(a
′) > 0 and rb(b
′) > 0}
is countable; so we can write R = {(a1, b1), (a2, b2), . . . }.
Now put δ = ǫ− Eµ(d
W
n ) and define
ǫ′(ai, bi) = d
W
n (ai, bi) + 2
−iδ
for (ai, bi) ∈ R and ǫ
′(a′, b′) = 0 for (a′, b′) /∈ R. Then
Eµ(ǫ
′) ≤ Eµ(d
W
n ) + δ = ǫ,
so playing µ and ǫ′ constitutes a legal move for D. Now,
since µ ∈ Cpl(ra, rb), µ(a
′, b′) = 0 for all (a′, b′) /∈ R. This
means that S must pick some (ai, bi) ∈ R. Then
dGn (ai, bi) = d
W
n (ai, bi) < ǫ
′(ai, bi),
so D wins the n-round game on (ai, bi, ǫ
′(ai, bi)).
Proof of Lemma 4.2.
Let ‖f − g‖∞ ≤ ǫ; we have to show ‖Pf − Pg‖∞ ≤ ǫ. So
let a ∈ ∆I ; then
|(Pf)(a)− (Pg)(a)| = Era(f − g) ≤ Era(ǫ) ≤ ǫ,
as required.
Proof of Theorem 4.3.
We proceed by simultaneous induction on n.
In the base case n = 0, all the behavioural distances are
the zero pseudometric: dG0 = 0 because by the rules of
the game each 0-round game is an immediate win for D;
dW0 = d
K
0 = 0 by definition; and d
L
0 = 0 because each rank-
0 concept is a propositional combination of truth constants
and therefore constant. Total boundedness follows directly
from the fact that under the zero pseudometric every ǫ-ball
is the entire space, regardless of ǫ. Finally, the density claim
follows because non-expansive maps under the zero pseudo-
metric are just constants in [0, 1] and the syntax of ALC(P)
includes truth constants q ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1].
For the inductive step, let I be a model and n > 0, and
assume as the inductive hypothesis that all claims in Theo-
rem 4.3 hold for all n′ < n. We begin with Item 1:
• dGn = d
W
n is Lemma 4.1.
• dWn = d
K
n follows by Kantorovich-Rubinstein dual-
ity (Lemma 3.4), since every totally bounded pseudometric
space is separable.
• dKn = d
L
n : Let a, b ∈ ∆
I and consider the map
G : Pred(∆I , dn−1)→ [0, 1], f 7→ |(Pf)(a)− (Pf)(b)|,
ThenG is a continuous function because all of its constituents
are continuous (in particular, P is continuous by Lemma 4.2).
By the induction hypothesis, and because density is pre-
served by continuous maps,G[ALC(P)n−1] is a dense subset
of G[Pred(∆I , dn−1)]. Thus,
dKn (a, b)
=
∨
A∈NC
|AI(a)− AI(b)| ∨
∨
G[Pred(∆I , dn−1)]
=
∨
A∈NC
|AI(a)− AI(b)| ∨
∨
G[ALC(P)n−1]
=
∨
A∈NC
|AI(a)− AI(b)| ∨
∨
rkC≤n−1
|(PC)I(a)− (PC)I(b)|
=
∨
rkC≤n
|CI(a)− CI(b)| = dLn(a, b).
To prove the penultimate step, we first note that “≤” follows
immediately. To see “≥”, we proceed by induction over the
propositional combinations of atomic concepts A ∈ NC and
concepts PC, where C ∈ ALC(P)n−1, using that for any
concepts C,D and q ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]:
|(C ⊖ q)I(a)− (C ⊖ q)I(b)| ≤ |CI(a)− CI(b)|
|(¬C)I(a)− (¬C)I(b)| = |CI(a)− CI(b)|
|(C ⊓D)I(a)− (C ⊓D)I(b)|
≤ max(|CI(a)− CI(b)|, |DI(a)−DI(b)|).
Item 2: We make use of the following version of the Arzela`-
Ascoli theorem [Wild et al., 2018a] where function spaces
are restricted to non-expansive functions instead of the more
general continuous functions, but the underlying spaces are
only required to be totally bounded instead of compact:
Lemma A.2 (Arzela`-Ascoli for totally bounded spaces). Let
(X, d) be a totally bounded pseudometric space. Then the
space Pred(X, d), equipped with the supremum pseudomet-
ric, is totally bounded.
By Lemma A.2, applied to the inductive hypothesis, we
know that the space Pred(∆I , dn−1) is totally bounded
wrt. the supremum pseudometric.
Let ǫ > 0. As ALC(P)n−1 is dense in Pred(∆
I , dn−1),
there exist finitely many C1, . . . , Cm ∈ ALC(P)n−1 such
that
m⋃
i=1
B ǫ
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(Ci) = Pred(∆
I , dn−1)
From these concepts, together with the atomic concepts
A1, . . . , Ak, we can construct the map
I : ∆I → [0, 1]k+m
a 7→ (AI1 (a), . . . , A
I
k (a), (PC1)
I(a), . . . , (PCm)
I(a)).
Note that we assume here that the set of atomic concepts is
a finite set NC = {A1, . . . , Ak}. This is without loss of gen-
erality for the modal characterization theorem, because every
formula of FO(P) can only contain finitely many proposi-
tional atoms, so NC can be restricted to just those atoms.
It turns out that I is an ǫ4 -isometry, that is
|dn(a, b)− ‖I(a)− I(b)‖∞| ≤
ǫ
4
for all a, b ∈ ∆I . Thus, by the triangle inequality, we can take
preimages to turn a finite ǫ4 -cover of [0, 1]
k+m (a compact,
hence totally bounded space) into a finite ǫ-cover of (∆I , dn).
Item 3: We make use of the following Stone-Weierstraß
theorem [Wild et al., 2018a] (again in a version for totally
bounded spaces and non-expansive maps):
Lemma A.3 (Stone-Weierstraß for totally bounded spaces).
Let (X, d) be a totally bounded pseudometric space, and
let L be a subset of Pred(X, d) such that f1, f2 ∈ L im-
plies min(f1, f2),max(f1, f2) ∈ L. Then L is dense in
Pred(X, d) if each f ∈ Pred(X, d) can be approximated at
each pair of points by functions in L; that is for all ǫ > 0 and
all x1, x2 ∈ X there exists g ∈ L such that
max(|f(x1)− g(x1)|, |f(x2)− g(x2)|) ≤ ǫ.
We apply Lemma A.3 to (∆I , dn) with L := ALC(P)n.
Clearly L is closed undermin andmax so, to finish the proof,
it suffices to give, for each ǫ > 0, each non-expansive map
f ∈ Pred(∆I , dn) and each pair of states a, b ∈ ∆
I a con-
cept C ∈ ALC(P)n such that
max(|f(a)− CI(a)|, |f(b)− CI(b)|) ≤ ǫ.
To construct such a C, we note that |f(a)− f(b)| ≤ dLn(a, b)
(by non-expansiveness), so there exists some D ∈ ALC(P)n
such that |DI(a)−DI(b)| ≥ |f(a)− f(b)|− ǫ. FromD, we
can construct C using truncated subtraction ⊖.
Proof of Lemma 4.5.
We show that D wins the bisimulation game for
(a0, f(a0), 0) by maintaining the invariant that the current
configuration is of the form (a, b, 0) with b = f(a), which
ensures that the winning condition always holds. It remains
to show that D can maintain the invariant.
In each round, D begins by picking µ(a′, b′) = ra(a
′) if
b′ = f(a′) and 0 otherwise, and ǫ′ = 0. We can see that
µ ∈ Cpl(ra, rb), because∑
b′∈∆J µ(a
′, b′) = ra(a
′)
and ∑
a′∈∆I µ(a
′, b′) =
∑
f(a′)=b′ ra(a
′) = rb(b
′)
for all a′ ∈ ∆I and b′ ∈ ∆J . Also, clearly Eµ(ǫ
′) = 0. Now
any choice by S leads to another configuration (a′, b′, 0)with
b′ = f(a′).
Proof of Lemma 4.6.
Let I be a model, and let h : I → F be the unique morphism.
Let a ∈ ∆I . Then dG(a, h(a)) = 0 by Lemma 4.5, and thus
φI(a) = φF (h(a)) and ψI(a) = ψF (h(a)) by bisimulation
invariance. So
‖φ− ψ‖I∞ =
∨
a∈∆I |φ
I(a)− ψI(a)|
=
∨
a∈∆I |φ
F (h(a))− ψF(h(a))|
≤ ‖φ− ψ‖F∞.
Proof of Lemma 5.2.
Player D wins by maintaining the invariant that whenever i
rounds have been played, the current configuration is of the
form (ai, ai, 0) for some ai ∈ ∆
I with D(a, ai) ≤ i. For
i < k, no configuration of this kind can be winning for S,
because the two states in this configuration represent the same
state in different models (recall that the winning conditions
are not checked after the last round has been played).
It remains to give a strategy for D that maintains the
invariant. It clearly holds at the start of the game, with
a0 = a. When the (i + 1)-th round is played, D can pick
µ ∈ Cpl(rai , rai) and ǫ
′ : ∆I × Uk(a)→ [0, 1] as follows:
µ(a′, a′′) =
{
πai(a
′), if a′ = a′′,
0, otherwise,
ǫ′(a′, a′′) = 0.
Clearly, Eµ(ǫ
′) = 0, so this is a legal move. Now the new
configuration chosen by S necessarily satisfies the invariant.
Proof of Lemma 5.6.
We proceed by induction over formulae.
• The cases A(xi) and xi = xj (with A ∈ NC) follow
immediately from the fact that the initial configuration
is a partial isomorphism.
• The Boolean cases (q, φ ⊖ q,¬φ, φ⊓ψ) follow directly
by the inductive hypothesis.
• ∃x. φ: Let (a¯, b¯) be the current configuration. Let δ > 0,
let a be such that
(∃x. φ)(a¯)− φ(a¯a) < δ,
and let b be the winning answer for D in reply to S
choosing a. By induction, φ(a¯a) = φ(b¯b), so
(∃x. φ)(b¯) ≥ φ(b¯b) = φ(a¯a) > (∃x. φ)(a¯)− δ.
Because δ > 0 was arbitrary, it follows that
(∃x. φ)(b¯) ≥ (∃x. φ)(a¯). We can symmetrically show
that (∃x. φ)(a¯) ≥ (∃x. φ)(b¯), which proves this case.
• xiP⌈xm+1 : φ⌉: Let (a¯, b¯) be the current configuration.
Suppose that S picks the index i and the fuzzy subset
φA : ∆
I → [0, 1], a 7→ φI(a¯a)
and D’s winning reply is ψB : ∆
J → [0, 1]. We show
that on the support of rbi , ψB must be equal to
φB : ∆
J → [0, 1], b 7→ φJ (b¯b).
Suppose there exists some b ∈ ∆J with r(bi, b) > 0 and
φB(b) 6= ψB(b). Then D has a winning reply a ∈ ∆
I
in case S picks this b, which means, by the rules of the
game, that r(ai, a) > 0 and φA(a) = ψB(b). However,
it is also true that φA(a) = φB(b), by the inductive hy-
pothesis. This is a contradiction.
Now, because ψB was a winning reply, we obtain
(xiP⌈xm+1 : φ⌉)(a¯) = Erai (φA)
= Erbi (ψB)
= Erbi (φB)
= (xiP⌈xm+1 : φ⌉)(b¯).
Proof of Lemma 5.8.
Let a be a state in a model I. We need to show φI(a) =
φI
k
a (a). Let J be a new model that extends I by adding n
disjoint copies of both I and Ika . Let K be the model that
extends Ika likewise. We finish the proof by showing that
φI(a) = φJ (a) = φK(a) = φI
k
a (a).
The first and third equality follow by bisimulation invari-
ance of φ (Lemma 5.7). The second equality follows by
Ehrenfeucht-Fraı¨sse´ invariance (Lemma 5.6) once we show
that D has a winning strategy in the n-round Ehrenfeucht-
Fraı¨sse´ game for J , a and K, a.
Such a winning strategy can be described as follows: For
a¯ = (a1, . . . , an), putU
k(a¯) =
⋃
i≤n U
k(ai). ThenDmain-
tains the invariant that, if the configuration reached after i
rounds is (b¯, c¯), then there exists an isomorphism fi between
Uki(b¯) and Uki(c¯) that maps each bj to the corresponding cj ,
where ki = 3
n−i.
The invariant holds at the start of the game, because the
neighbourhoods on both sides are just Uk(a). Similarly,
whenever the invariant holds, the current configuration is a
partial isomorphism by restriction of the given isomorphism
to the two vectors of the configuration.
Now we consider what happens during the rounds. Sup-
pose that i rounds have been played, and the current configu-
ration is (b¯, c¯). If S decides to play a standard round, playing
some b ∈ ∆J , then there are two cases:
• b ∈ U2ki+1(b¯): In this case, the radius-ki+1 neighbour-
hood Uki+1(b) of b is fully contained in the domain
Uki(b¯) of fi – this follows by the triangle inequality, as
2ki+1+ ki+1 = 3ki+1 = ki. NowD can just reply with
c := fi(b), and an isomorphism fi+1 betweenU
ki+1(b¯b)
and Uki+1(c¯c) is formed by restricting the domain and
codomain of fi appropriately.
• b /∈ U2ki+1(b¯): In this case, the radius-ki+1 neighbour-
hoods Uki+1(b) of b and Uki+1(b¯) of b¯ do not intersect –
this too follows from the triangle inequality. NowD can
pick a fresh copy of I or Ika in K (depending on which
kind of copy b lies in); her reply c is then just b in that
copy. Here, a fresh copy is one that was never visited
on any of the previous rounds. By construction of J
and K, such a copy is always available. This means that
we now have two isomorphisms, one between Uki+1(b¯)
and Uki+1(c¯) (by restriction of fi), and one between
Uki+1(b) and Uki+1(c) (by isomorphism of the respec-
tive copies of I or Ika ). Because these isomorphisms
have disjoint domains and codomains, we can combine
them to form the desired isomorphism fi+1.
If S plays a standard round with some c ∈ ∆K instead, the
same argument applies.
Finally, if S starts a probabilistic round by picking an index
0 ≤ j ≤ i and playing some φB : ∆
J → [0, 1], then we first
note that, by the rules of the game, the support of φB must
be contained in U1(b¯), which in turn must be contained in the
domain of fi. This means that D can construct φC : ∆
K →
[0, 1] by mapping along fi, i.e. φC(c) = φB(f
−1
i (c)) for all
successors c of cj , and φC(c) = 0 otherwise. Now, whichever
b or c is picked by S,D can just reply with c := fi(b) or b :=
f−1i (c) and fi+1 is formed as in the first case of a standard
round. Again, the same argument applies if S picks a fuzzy
subset φC on the other side.
Proof of Lemma 6.2.
D wins by maintaining the invariant that the configuration of
the game is of the form (a¯, last(a¯), 0) for some a¯ ∈ (∆I)+.
To do so, she can put µ(a¯a, a) = πa¯(a¯a) = πlast(a¯)(a) for all
a ∈ (∆I)+, all other values of µ are 0, and ǫ′ = 0. Then any
move by S leads to a configuration where the invariant holds.
Proof of Lemma 6.3.
Let I and J be two models and let a ∈ ∆I and b ∈ ∆J be
two states such that dGk (a, b) < ǫ. It is enough to show that
|φI(a)− φJ (b)| ≤ ǫ.
We denote by a′ and a′′ the copies of a in I∗ and (I∗)ka,
respectively. Similarly, b′ and b′′ denote the copies of b in
J ∗ and (J ∗)kb . By Lemma 6.2, D wins the 0-bisimulation-
game for I, a and I∗, a′ (similarly for J ) and by Lemma 5.2,
she also wins the k-round 0-bisimulation game for I∗, a′ and
(I∗)ka, a
′′ (similarly forJ ). Because behavioural distance dGk
is a pseudometric, this means that
dGk (a
′′, b′′)
≤ dGk (a
′′, a′) + dGk (a
′, a)
+ dGk (a, b) + d
G
k (b, b
′) + dGk (b
′, b′′)
= dGk (a, b) < ǫ,
so D has a winning strategy in the k-round ǫ-bisimulation
game for (I∗)ka, a
′′ and (J ∗)kb , b
′′.
In both (I∗)ka, a
′′ and (J ∗)kb , b
′′, the reachable states form
a tree of depth at most k. This implies that, after i rounds of
the game, the two states on either side of the current config-
uration are nodes at distance i from the root of their respec-
tive tree. Thus, whenever k rounds have been played in the
game,S does not have a legalmove in the next round, because
at that point, both nodes in the configuration are necessarily
leaves and thus blocking. This in turn means that ifD can win
the k-round game, she also wins the unbounded game, so, by
bisimulation invariance of φ, |φ(I
∗)k
a(a′′)−φ(J
∗)k
b (b′′)| ≤ ǫ.
By locality and bisimulation invariance of φ, and again
Lemma 6.2, we have φ(I
∗)k
a(a′′) = φI
∗
(a′) = φI(a) as well
as φ(J
∗)k
b (b′′) = φJ
∗
(b′) = φJ (b). Thus |φI(a)−φJ (b)| ≤
ǫ, as claimed.
